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ABSTRACT 
This study aimed to test the predictions that, once psychiatric disorders are controlled for, 
offenders are more likely to be dismissive in their attachment patterns than are controls, and 
that the capacity of forensic patients to reflect on mental states of self and other is critically 
impaired, limiting their capacity to empathize and making them more liable to offend. Twenty-
two prisoners were compared with 22 personality disordered patients without an offending 
history, and 22 normal controls. The Adult Attachment Interview was employed to examine 
early childhood trauma and attachment patterns; and the Reflective Function (RF) Scale was 
applied to measure capacity to reflect on mental states. The prisoners had experienced more 
abuse and neglect than the patients, yet were more likely to be coded resolved to their abuse 
on the AAI. As predicted, prisoners were more likely to be dismissive in their attachment 
patterns, and the prisoners’ RF was more impaired than that of the patients. Violent offenders 
showed the greatest deficits in RF. We suggest that prisoners’ developmental path of 
psychopathology is characterized by a disavowal of attachment-related experiences and of 
the capacity to think about them, in partial response to severe childhood trauma. The 
impairment of RF removes a critical barrier that might normally inhibit offending, leaving them 
more liable to act, especially in violent ways. 
 
Introduction 
Over the last decades we have learnt that the risk factors associated with antisocial 
behaviour in general and violence in particular are evident from relatively early childhood. The 
findings from reviews (Farrington, 2003; Loeber, Green, & Lahey, 2003; Rutter, Giller, & 
Hagell, 1998) and from some of the best-known longitudinal studies, including the Cambridge 
Study (Farrington, 1995), the Pittsburgh studies (Loeber, Stouthamer-Loeber, Farrington, 
Lahey, Keenan, & White, 2002), and the Dunedin Study (Moffitt, Caspi, Harrington, & Milne, 
2002) have been fairly consistent, even if relatively small in magnitude. Repeatedly reported 
personality and temperament individual risk factors include: (1) uncontrolled temperament 
observed at age 3 leading to adult aggression (e.g., Caspi, 2000), (2) impulsive traits at age 
8–10 associated with adult offending (e.g., Farrington, 1995), (3) hyperactive traits at 13 
linked to adult violence (e.g., Klinteberg, Andersson, Magnusson, & Stattin, 1993), (4) callous 
traits at 7–12 predicting antisocial personality disorder in maturity (e.g., Loeber, Burke, & 
Lahey, 2002), and (5) low IQ and poor academic achievement predicting being arrested and 
charged (Moffitt, 1993). The risk of an adult antisocial personality disorder diagnosis has 
been shown to be increased by a range of childhood psychiatric conditions: (1) major 
depression at age 14 (e.g., Kasen, Cohen, Skodol, Johnson, Smailes, & Brook, 2001), (2) 
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oppositional defiant disorder diagnosed at 7–12 (e.g., Loeber, Burke, et al., 2002), (3) 
conduct disorder diagnosed at 9–16 (e.g., Harrington, Fudge, Rutter, Pickles, & Hill, 1991), 
and substance abuse observed at 7–12 (e.g., Loeber, Burke, et al., 2002). 
Particular features of parenting and parents have also been good predictors of later 
offending and violence, including: (1) antisocial diagnosis and/or behaviour in the parent 
when the child is 8–10 (e.g., Smith & Farrington, 2004), (2) poor supervision of 8-year-olds 
(e.g., Farrington, 1995), (3) abuse when the child is under 12 (e.g., Widom, 1989), and (3) 
early or late exposure to domestic violence, which appears to predict not just violence but 
also violence to the individual’s own child (e.g., Moffitt & Caspi, 2003). In addition, of course, 
wider social factors have also been shown to play a part, including obvious risk factors such 
as association in adolescence with a deviant peer group (e.g., Lipsey & Derzon, 1998) and 
being in a high-delinquency school (e.g., Farrington, 1995). 
Knowledge of risk factors on its own is of limited value. Risk factors with clear causal 
significance that are open to modification as part of prevention have the greatest practical 
relevance. Unmodifiable risk factors (e.g., gender) or modifiable risk factors that antedate the 
problem of violence but are not part of a causal process (e.g., peer delinquency) are of 
limited value. For example, peer delinquency may be as much a consequence of a delinquent 
and violent pre-disposition as its cause (Farrington, Loeber, Yin, & Anderson, 2002). Broadly 
speaking, the greater the number of risk domains entailed in the history of a particular case, 
the higher the risk of violent antisocial behaviour (Loeber, Stouthamer-Loeber, et al., 2002). 
Violence is the product of a chain of events over the course of a child’s development, where 
risks accumulate and reinforce each other (Maughan & Rutter, 2001). So, for example, low IQ 
places a child at increased risk of experiencing problems at school, which in turn can create 
major problem behaviours that lead to exclusion, and failing to graduate can lead to 
employment problems that in turn increase the risk of persistent antisocial behaviour. This is 
the argument for ensuring that violence-prevention programs must simultaneously target 
multiple risk factors. There is further valuable epidemiological information to be gained from 
understanding why certain factors appear to moderate the impact of risk factors. These 
characteristics, usually termed protective factors (Garmezy & Masten, 1994), appear to 
interrupt the causal chain of risk. For example, in the case of risk factors for violence, we 
know that characteristics such as shyness and inhibition, intelligence, a close relationship 
with at least one adult, good school or sporting achievements, and non-antisocial peers can 
positively moderate the impact of risk factors (Losel & Bender, 2003). 
The new data from the clustering of developmental trajectories has brought a shift of 
emphasis to the developmental understanding of violence (Cote, Tremblay, Nagin, Zoccolillo, 
& Vitaro, 2002; Moffitt et al., 2002; Nagin & Tremblay, 2001; Shaw, Gilliom, Ingoldsby, & 
Nagin, 2002). The simultaneous analysis of the 6 samples by Broidy et al. (Broidy, Nagin, 
Tremblay, Bates, Brame, Dodge, et al., 2003) led the authors to conclude that there appears 
to be a continuity in problem behaviour from childhood to adolescence and that such 
continuity is especially acute when early problem behaviour takes the form of physical 
aggression. Chronic physical aggression during the elementary school years seems 
specifically to increase the risk for continued physical violence, as well as other non-violent 
forms of delinquency during adolescence. This was true, however, only for boys, because the 
results indicate no clear linkage between childhood physical aggression and adolescent 
offending among female samples. Historically, models of aggression have focused on how 
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human aggression is acquired through learning, rehearsal, and reinforcement of aggression-
related knowledge structures (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Yet aggression appears to be 
there as a problem from early childhood, arguably from toddlerhood, and perhaps from birth. 
Violence ultimately signals the failure of normal developmental processes to deal with 
something that occurs naturally. The key concerns of prevention are the individual, 
behavioural, family, and wider societal characteristics (including custodial services) of the 
individuals who do not desist from aggression during childhood. 
At this juncture we should perhaps acknowledge Freud (1920/1961; 1930/1961) and 
classical psychoanalytical views that have consistently suggested—in line with modern 
developmental data—that social experience is there to tame a destructiveness that is 
inherent in humanity. Psychoanalysts expect to find violence in all individuals since it is a 
fundamental destructive urge, or, in Freud’s words, an “independent aggressive instinct” 
(Freud, 1930/1961). Biological predisposition and social influence do not create 
destructiveness, but rather compromise the social processes that normally serve to regulate 
and tame it. Not that aggression always shows the failure of some system. We shall argue 
that the environment can spectacularly fail to provide the infant with the means to regulate its 
destructive potential. Violence may be the individual’s attempt to tackle a damaging 
environment and as such can be “a sign of life” as Winnicott (1975, p. 85) called it, a sign of 
our struggles to carry on as living beings under intolerable conditions. The innate aggression 
theory must take proper account of the existence of positive, survival-oriented aggression and 
also of aggression that is a genuine protest against very considerable hardships in life. 
An association between attachment and offending has also been long assumed. 
Disruptive family backgrounds including childhood separation and trauma are common in the 
history of offenders and delinquents (Bowlby, 1944, 1988; Lewis, 1989). Bowlby (1944) 
suggested in a study of a sample of offenders that the disruption of early attachment bonds 
may lead to adult attachment disorders—especially of an affectionless kind. Attachment 
theory provides a model to explain the links between emotional deprivation in childhood and 
the development of offending. The theory suggests that deprivation disrupts early attachment 
relationships, causes children to seek self-protection by avoiding or dismissing attachment 
relationships, and thus they do not have a way of forestalling the emergence of delinquency 
in the context of other personal and environmental risk factors (Rutter et al., 1998). The 
avoidance of attachment relationships may be a vulnerability factor that leads to a reduction 
of emotional commitment to social institutions (Hirschi, 1969) and may be directly involved in 
the aetiology of conduct disorder (Greenberg, Speltz, & DeKlyen, 1993), which is a risk factor 
for offending. While the point prevalence of dismissing attachment is common (20–30%) (van 
IJzendoorn,
1
 1995), offending is relatively rare. Thus dismissive attachment on its own can no 
more provide an adequate model of offending behaviour than personality disorder and 
psychiatric illness. While neither dismissing attachment nor psychiatric illness and/or 
personality disorder can account for offending behaviour, it is possible that the two factors 
interact to increase the risk of offending. 
We know of only one study using the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) coding systems 
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(George, Kaplan, & Main, 1985; Main & Goldwyn, 1991) reporting the relationship of 
attachment to offending. Van IJzendoorn and colleagues (Dozier, Stovall, & Albus, 1999; Van 
IJzendoorn, Feldbrugge, Derks, de Ruiter, Verhagen, Philipse, et al., 1997) studied 40 
offenders in a forensic setting but could not differentiate the offenders from a psychiatrically 
disordered group. As psychopathology in general and personality disorder in particular are 
known to be associated with abnormal distribution of attachment patterns (Fonagy, Leigh, 
Steele, Steele, Kennedy, Mattoon, et al., 1996), and as psychiatric disorders, particularly 
personality disorders, are common in prison groups (see above), we felt that the distinctive 
character, if any, of attachment in offenders could be adequately examined only if psychiatric 
diagnoses were controlled for by matching cases and controls. In line with Bowlby’s 
hypothesis, we expected to find that when samples were matched for psychiatric and 
personality disorders, a higher proportion of prisoners’ AAI narratives would be classified as 
dismissive than controls’. 
We further hypothesized that a deficit in mentalizing (Frith & Frith, 1999) might be a 
critical mediating mechanism between insecure dismissing attachment and offending 
behaviour (Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1997). Lack of a robust capacity to envision 
mental states in others might remove a critical barrier that normally inhibits behaviour that 
impinges on the rights of others, making such individuals more liable to cause harm. A 
somewhat retarded mentalizing capacity in insecurely attached children was demonstrated in 
a prospective study of 5-year-olds followed from birth (Fonagy, 1997). To investigate the 
relationship between mentalizing and offending, we have operationalized the former concept 
in terms of the construct of the Reflective Function scale (RF), described in Fonagy et al. 
(Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998). We hypothesized that offenders would score lower 
on this measure than matched controls. 
Method 
Sample 
The prison group was selected by taking consecutive psychiatric admissions to the Health 
Care Centre (HCC) of a prison. The prison was a high-security and local remand prison, for 
male prisoners. The prisoners were referred to the HCC from reception when they entered 
the prison, for medical and/or psychiatric assessment and treatment. Inclusion criteria were 
(1) age range 20–40; (2) English as first language, to maximize the accuracy of the AAI 
coding; (3) a current, or if on remand a past, history of at least two convictions with at least 
one custodial sentence; and (4) at least one diagnosable Axis I or Axis II disorder, to permit 
matching of cases. The exclusion criteria were: (1) schizophrenia, (2) delusional psychoses, 
(3) organic brain disorder, and (4) an IQ of less than 80. Thirty-two subjects were referred 
during the study period. Eight did not meet the criteria (the majority on the basis of psychotic 
illness or organic brain disorders), and 2 did not agree to participate, leaving 22 male subjects 
in the prison sample. Remand and sentenced prisoners were included in equal numbers. The 
index offences ranged in severity and were divided for comparison into 2 sub-samples: less 
violent offences against property (n = 10) and more violent offences against persons (n = 12). 
The less violent offences against property included theft (n = 1), handling stolen goods (n = 
1), burglary (n = 4), damage to property (n = 1), deception (n = 1), and drug supplying and 
importation (n = 2). The more violent offences against people included murder (n = 1), armed 
robbery (n = 2), malicious wounding/wounding with intent (n = 2), grievous bodily harm (n = 
1), rape (n = 2), indecent assault (n = 1), and drink and driving (n = 3). The 3 drink-and-
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driving offences were included in the violent group, because of the lack of concern expressed 
for others, and they each had coexisting current violent offences—one assault to the 
arresting police officer, the other two to attachment figures—as well as past violent offences. 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
The demographic and clinical characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 1. Social 
class was established on the basis of the UK Registrar General’s Classification of 
Occupations (General Register Office, 1966) according to occupation before imprisonment 
or, if unemployed, by father’s occupation. Nineteen subjects were white, 1 second-generation 
African Caribbean, 1 mixed-race African Caribbean and Canadian, and 1 African. 
All subjects had at least one Axis I disorder, 80% having three or more. They all had at 
least one Axis II disorder, 50% meeting DSM–IV criteria for BPD. 
The personality disorder comparison (PD) group, consisting of 22 personality-disordered 
patients, was recruited from an inpatient psychotherapy program and a community-based 
study of personality disorder. The selection criteria were identical for the prison group, except 
that individuals with histories of offending and/or convictions were excluded. Matching was on 
the basis of gender, age, IQ, social class, and approximate diagnosis on Axis I and Axis II. 
The mean overall number of diagnoses was somewhat greater in the prison group, but the 
Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores were somewhat lower in the patient group. 
Matching was quite successful, given the very large number of comorbid diagnoses in both 
groups. Significant group differences were reached in only one diagnostic category. There 
was somewhat more anxiety in the clinical comparison group (p < 0.05) and slightly more 
cluster B personality disorders in the prison group (see Table 1). 
The medical controls consisted of 22 subjects selected from a hospital medical 
department. They were a mixture of inpatients and outpatients from two medical units of a 
central London teaching hospital screened for psychiatric disorder using the GHQ (Goldberg 
& Williams, 1988), and all those above the clinical cut-off were excluded. They were matched 
for demographic criteria of gender, age, social class, and IQ. 
Procedure 
A psychiatrist briefly interviewed all prison subjects referred to the HCC when they entered 
the HCC, to establish initial inclusion and exclusion criteria. All the other interviews were 
conducted by the research psychiatrist (AL) one week later, to allow subjects some time to 
withdraw from drugs and to adjust to imprisonment. The AAI was then administered to all 
subjects and was audio-recorded. Mostly in the same interview session, the structured 
psychiatric assessments were administered to establish the range and intensity of psychiatric 
symptoms, personality disorder, and overall level of functioning. Finally, tests of reading 
ability and self-report instruments were administered, and a record of index and past offences 
was collected from the Home Office files for each prisoner. The PD and medical control 
groups were assessed, following the same sequence of evaluations, with the exceptions that 
the absence of a history of offending was established during initial screening, and the hospital 
comparison group was not administered structured psychiatric assessments. 
Measures 
1. The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) (George et al., 1985). The AAI is a semi-structured 
interview used to obtain classifications of attachment representations, which are generally 
considered to correspond to Bowlby’s notion of internal working models. It consists of a series 
of questions and probes designed to elicit as full a narrative as possible about the subject’s 
 5 
childhood attachment experiences. Experiences of loss, trauma (physical and sexual abuse), 
separation, and rejection are directly questioned, as well as the subject’s evaluation of the 
effect of these experiences on their current functioning and adult personality. A description of 
their caregivers is asked for, followed by memories to illustrate these descriptions with the 
aim of eliciting information about the individual’s current internal representations of childhood 
attachment figures and experiences. 
The interview is audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. The transcripts are rated on 
scales concerning experience (love, neglect, rejection, and pressure by caregivers) and 
states of mind (anger, idealization, derogation, and coherence of the narrative), as the latter 
has been shown to be the most powerful predictor of the attachment security of infants in 
trans-generational studies (van IJzendoorn, 1995). The AAI Scales are 1 to 9–point scales, 
with manualized definitions for each point. 
The Main and Goldwyn coding system (Main & Goldwyn, 1994) distinguishes three major 
categories of interviews related to these scales. Secure transcripts, designated F for free, are 
coherent and balanced evaluation of past attachment experiences; insecure-dismissive 
transcripts (Ds) are characterized by an attempt to limit the import of attachment relationships 
by means of cut-off statements, lack of recall, idealization, and/or derogation and considering 
the self as unaffected by negative attachment experiences; and insecure-preoccupied 
transcripts (E) are characterized by passive, fearful, or angrily preoccupied and entangled 
narratives. In addition to the three main categories, subtypes of F, Ds, and E are also 
classified. For example, Ds1 is at the most severe end of the dismissive category, compared 
to Ds2, where there is some devaluation of attachment alongside some apparent continuing 
capacity for it, and Ds3 where a restriction of feeling is manifest in the narrative. 
An Unresolved (Us) classification may be assigned to transcripts, superimposed upon any 
of the other classifications, if there is a failure fully to mourn a significant loss (the death of a 
significant person) or failure to come to terms with trauma (physical or sexual abuse). An 
Unresolved classification is assigned to a transcript if significant trauma or loss are described 
and there are indications of associated disorganization of discourse or disorientation of 
reasoning. 
A fifth category, Cannot Classify (CC) has also been described (Hesse & Main, 2000). It 
represents a mixture of coexisting attachment strategies of dismissal and preoccupation 
within a single narrative. Previously such cases were rated in accordance with the closest 
single category (D, E, or F). It is likely that the CC classification will include individuals whose 
attachment representations are in some degree disorganized, and consequently they 
manifest multiple models in their narratives. 
All the interviews were rated by two experienced and reliable raters who were blind to the 
sample and had no access to any information about the subjects other than gender. The 
current raters’ inter-rater reliabilities were consistent with those reported in the literature: 
100% agreement for secure and insecure attachment classification, 85% on the major 
classification, and 70–80% on sub-classification categories (see Bakermans-Kranenburg & 
van IJzendoorn, 1993). Cohen’s kappa for the four-way classification was .8 between two 
raters. 
2. The Reflective Function (RF) Scale (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, & Target, 1997). The RF 
Scale was devised by Fonagy et al. (Fonagy, Steele, et al., 1997) to use with AAI transcripts, 
to give a measure of the subject’s predisposition to infer mental states (feelings, thoughts, 
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beliefs, and intentions) in self and others in the course of attachment narratives. The RF 
Scale was originally based on Main’s (1991)
2
 metacognitive monitoring scale. The current 
coding system is described in a 50-page manual (Fonagy, Steele, et al., 1997) available from 
the second author. Coders are instructed to examine AAI transcripts with a view to 
establishing the clarity of the subject’s understanding of the nature of mental states as this 
emerges from descriptions of feelings and thoughts in the attachment figure and reactions to 
them. Answers to questions that specifically invite reflectiveness (e.g., “Why do you think your 
parents behaved as they did?”) are given extra weight. The lowest level of the scale is 
reserved for those who reject the invitation to be reflective (e.g., “You tell me why they 
behaved that way. You are the shrink.”) 
The RF Scale is an 11-point scale, with manualized definitions for each anchor point. A 
low level of RF is assigned to narratives where generalizations or banal reflective statements 
dominate. Statements that appear to be accurate reflections of the thoughts and feelings of 
attachment figures or the subject in relation to them, but are partial (only occur occasionally in 
the interview), somewhat predictable, and adequate, rather than exceptional, indicate a 
moderate level of RF. Evidence for high RF is offered by consistent attention to psychological 
states of the protagonist in the narrative, making exceptionally frequent insightful statements 
on conscious and non-conscious motivations underpinning the subject’s own and others’ 
behaviour, particularly of attachment figures. The reliability of the RF scale after training is 
high (r = 0.91). 
3. The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM–III–R (SCID I with psychotic screen) 
(Spitzer, Williams, Gibbon, & First, 1990). This was used to establish current and past 
psychiatric disorder. This semi-structured interview provides detailed information on past and 
present psychopathology, for Axis I DSM–III–R diagnoses. It incorporates the Global 
Assessment of Functioning (GAF) Scale, which provides an overall measure of psychological, 
social, and occupational functioning, for Axis V of DSM–III–R. GAF provides a hypothetical 
continuum of mental health to illness on a 1–90 scale. To determine the reliability of the 
research psychiatrists on these instruments, Cohen’s kappa and Pearson’s r reliability 
coefficients were computed as appropriate. Values
 
of were calculated for each Axis I 
diagnosis (SCID-I), yielding
 
a median value of 0.85 (range 0.73–1.00). 
4. The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM–III–R Personality Disorders (SCID-II) 
(Spitzer et al., 1990). This is another semi-structured interview that uses DSM–III–R 
operational criteria to diagnose personality disorders. The use of phenomenological 
assessments of PD are controversial (Westen, 1998), but the SCID-II is the most commonly 
used instrument for establishing whether patients meet DSM Axis II criteria. On Axis II (SCID-
II),
 
reliability of diagnoses was 0.61 for cluster A, 0.67 for cluster
 
B, and 1.00 for cluster C. On 
the GAS an interclass correlation
 
coefficient (ICC) of 0.78 was obtained for the total score,
 
showing satisfactory inter-rater agreement. 
5. Forensic Psychiatric Clinical Interview. A detailed clinical interview was carried out for 
each subject in the prison group in order to elicit information about the index and past 
offences, which were confirmed from Home Office files. There was generally a high level of 
agreement between prisoners’ reports and official records. 
6. National Adult Reading Test (NART) (Nelson, 1982). This was used to estimate the 
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subject’s verbal IQ. 
7. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck, 1993; Belsky, Rovine, & Taylor, 1984). This 
was used to assist in matching subjects on the severity of their depression. The BDI is a 21-
item inventory that measures the subject’s symptoms and concerns about his or her current 
level of depression. 
Results 
1. Attachment Classifications 
<TABLE 2 HERE> 
Table 2 shows the distribution of attachment classifications across the three samples. A chi-
squared test revealed that the distributions were significantly different, with far fewer secure 
codings in the two psychiatric groups than in the medical controls (
2 
= 23.3, df = 6, p < 
0.001). Contrasting the prisoners and the matched PD group, the differences remained 
statistically significant (
2 
= 12.8, df = 3, p < 0.005). More AAIs were coded as dismissive in 
the prison sample than in the psychiatric group (36% compared to 0%), while the 
preoccupied classification was more common in the psychiatric controls than in the prisoners 
(50% compared to 14%). 
A high proportion of subjects had CC as their primary classification, in both the prison and 
the PD control group, but this did not appear to differentiate the groups (32% as opposed to 
27%). Examining the distribution of the sub-classification of the Ds classification revealed that 
in the prison sample the modal sub-classification was Ds1, with 63% of the dismissive 
subjects having this sub-classification. Ds1 represents the extreme end of the dismissive 
spectrum. In the PD control group the modal sub-classification was E2 (angrily preoccupied). 
There were no differences in the prevalence of reported loss among the three groups. 
Abuse, severe enough to meet criteria, was reported only in the prisoners and the PD control 
sample (see Table 2). The prisoners reported significantly more abuse (82% versus 41%, 
Fisher Exact Probability Test p < 0.05). The distribution of type of abuse did not differ, with 
both groups being somewhat more likely to report physical rather than sexual abuse (Fisher 
Exact Probability Test, NS
3
). 
Qualitative examination of the transcripts revealed that not only did the prisoners report 
more abuse, but their reports frequently described extremely severe and highly bizarre 
punishments. One example was a prisoner who described how his father burnt his hands on 
an oven to punish him for stealing coins from a gas meter in his home. Another prisoner 
recalled being nailed to a cross, through his hands, as a young child. He had to be taken to 
hospital afterwards to have the nails removed. While in general these reports could not be 
verified, details such as the presence of scars on the subject’s hands in these cases lent 
support to the narratives. 
Lack of resolution of mourning (LRM) scores above the cut point of 5 were given only in 
the two psychiatric groups, with none of the medical controls’ AAIs meeting criteria for a U 
classification (see Table 2). Contrasting the two psychiatric groups, we found that somewhat 
fewer of the AAIs of the prison group were coded Unresolved than in the PD control group 
(36% as opposed to 59%), but this difference did not reach statistical significance on Fisher’s 
Test. When we looked at lack of resolution to abuse separately from LRM for loss (see Table 
2), we found that in the prisoner group lack of resolution to abuse was significantly less 
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common (Fisher’s Exact Test p < .05). 
2. AAI Scale Scores 
In addition to examining differences in attachment classifications, we also explored 
differences between groups in terms of scores assigned to the AAI narratives on the 
experience and state of mind scales. Mean scores for the three groups are shown in Table 3. 
In the comparison between group means using one-way ANOVAs,
4
 highly significant 
differences were found on all the scales, with the exception of derogation and lack of recall. 
Post hoc tests with Bonferroni adjustment were performed separately on all scales between 
the prison and the two control groups. The differences between the prison and the medical 
groups were in the expected direction. All scales yielded significant F values. The comparison 
of the prisoner and personality-disordered groups on the experience scales yielded significant 
differences only for “pressure to achieve” and “neglect” ratings, with the prison group rated 
lower on the former and higher on the latter. On the state of mind scales, AAIs for the prison 
group were rated as less angry, more idealizing, and less coherent than the PD controls. 
<Table 3 here> 
3. Reflective Function Scale Scores 
The mean reflective function ratings for the AAI transcripts of the three groups are also 
shown in Table 3. The one-way ANOVA was highly significant, with both psychiatric groups 
scoring relatively low, while the mean for the medical control group was close to the expected 
value for a normal sample. On post hoc comparison, the prison group emerged as 
significantly lower in reflective function than the PD psychiatric controls (p < .005). 
We further compared the clinical groups in terms of the number of subjects with RF in the 
“deficit” range, defined as a rating below 3. Of the prison group, 73% had low RF by this 
definition, compared with 32% of the PD psychiatric controls (Fisher Exact Test p < 0.01). 
Finally, while the groups were relatively well matched for Axis II disorders, anxiety disorder 
was more common in the psychiatric control group. We wanted to ascertain that differences 
in the distribution of attachment classifications and RF could not be accounted for in terms of 
the under-representation of anxiety diagnoses in the prison sample. A three-way contingency 
table was created with high versus low anxiety, prison versus PD psychiatric group, and 
attachment classification respectively as factors in the analysis of attachment classification. 
The hierarchical log linear model yielded no main effect interaction with anxiety for either 
dismissing or preoccupied AAI classifications. The analysis was repeated with high–low RF 
level as the third variable with similar results. 
The prison sample was subdivided according to their index offences, and into a violent 
and non-violent subgroup. Violence against attachment figures dominated the offences in the 
violent group. The victims of 4 of the most violent offences (murder, wounding with intent, and 
G.B.H.) were in a current attachment relationship with the perpetrator. The victims of the 3 
sex offences were also known to the offenders. In contrast, victims of the non-violent 
offences were not known to the perpetrator. 
Fisher’s Exact Test was used to examine whether individuals with violent offences were 
more likely to be rated below 3 on RF. Of individuals with violent offences, 93%  had low RF 
scores, in contrast to 29% of those with non-violent offences (p < .004). The mean RF ratings 
obtained by the violent group was also significantly lower on a t-test (MeanVIOL = 1.40; 
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MeanNON-VIOL = 2.82; t = 2.38; DF = 21; p < .02) . 
Discussion 
Adult attachment interviews with this group of psychiatrically disordered prisoners have 
shown that this group are distinct in their representations of attachment relationships. 
Compared to both personality-disordered and a normal control group, they were significantly 
more likely to be insecure in their attachment classifications. The prison and PD group were 
more likely to be insecure than a control group without major psychiatric problems. In terms of 
the form of insecurity, prisoners were more likely to be dismissive than a control group with 
the same PD diagnosis. An unexpectedly high proportion of AAIs were classified as Ds1, 
which represents the extreme end of the dismissive category, characterized by idealization 
and a failure to acknowledge attachment-related difficulties. The greater number of 
dismissive cases in the prison group is consistent with Bowlby’s view that offending behaviour 
is associated with distinct and abnormal patterns of attachment. The observation that 
offenders were more likely to be coded as dismissive (particularly the extreme Ds1 category) 
supports Bowlby’s hypothesis that offending is a consequence of the disruption of early 
attachment relationships leading to an affectionless character pathology. We suggest that 
this dismissive style emerges in these cases as one form of defence against adverse 
attachment experiences, in particular neglect and severe physical abuse (Main, Kaplan, & 
Cassidy, 1985). Nevertheless, it should be remembered that  only 36% of AAIs were coded 
as dismissing. However, an additional 32% were classified as CC which carries significant 
dismissing features. 
The prisoners reported more experiences of abuse than the PD psychiatric controls. Type 
of abuse did not differentiate the groups, although there appeared to be somewhat more 
physical abuse in the prisoners, sometimes quite severe and bizarre. The findings of abuse 
are, however, based on self-report in the AAI rather than standardized interviews designed 
for the purpose of evaluating childhood maltreatment (Bifulco, Brown, & Harris, 1994). 
However, the prisoners consistently reported experiences that reflected less concern with 
them as children (higher rates of neglect and less pressure to achieve). Despite this lack of 
concern and more experiences of abuse, their state of mind related to attachment appears as 
less angry, more idealizing, and less coherent than that of a matched control group of 
individuals with very similar psychiatric and personality-disordered diagnoses, but without an 
offending history. A psychoanalytic understanding may conceptualize the prisoners’ tendency 
to be more dismissive, less angry at and more likely to idealize one parent, despite their 
experiences of maltreatment, in terms of splitting (Kernberg, 1992). They split their internal 
parental objects into good and bad, and use processes of denial, idealization, and 
identification with the aggressor to protect their feelings about their good internal object and 
themselves. 
Surprisingly, although the prisoners reported histories of severe and sometimes bizarre 
physical abuse, on the AAI they rarely met criteria for lack of resolution of these experiences. 
Disorganized discourse or disorientated reasoning in relation to the trauma is required as 
evidence for the unresolved classification in the Main and Goldwyn system (Main & Goldwyn, 
1998). We propose that the prisoners instead disavow (Freud, 1927/1961) their attachment 
experiences, so that they do not express them in the form recognized by this classification 
system. The disavowal limits their capacity for mental representation of such experiences, 
including those of trauma, that are instead experienced concretely and even physically, 
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making them liable to act in bodily ways and offend. 
In contrast, the PD psychiatric group were rated as more unresolved in relation to their 
abuse. They were also more likely to be preoccupied in their attachment patterns (a high 
proportion were rated E2 sub-category of preoccupied status, characterized by anger towards 
caregivers). This finding supports earlier studies that have shown a predominance of 
preoccupied attachment patterns in BPD patients (Fonagy et al., 1996; Patrick, Hobson, 
Castle, Howard, & Maughan, 1994). They had more anxiety disorders, which have been 
found to be associated with unresolved states (Fonagy et al., 1996). We propose that the 
personality-disordered patients, who are more unresolved to their trauma, more anxious and 
angry about it, are more likely to be recognized as requiring treatment. We hypothesize that 
the prisoners, with their dismissive strategy, apparent lack of unresolved states, low anxiety, 
and offending behaviour may be more liable to be judged negatively by society, requiring 
punishment rather than treatment. We therefore suggest that selection biases could be 
operating, so that patients who express more unresolved states to their trauma and have a 
greater capacity to reflect are more likely to be offered treatment. 
Finally, we found that prisoners were significantly lower in reflective function ratings than 
the PD control group, whose RF was in turn lower than that of the normal controls. Those 
prisoners whose offences were violent in nature were rated lowest on this scale. Their low 
reflective function confirms the hypothesis that the prisoners have a limited capacity to think 
or “mentalize” about their own or others’ mental states, in terms of feelings, thoughts, beliefs, 
or motivation. We suggest that severe early trauma in the context of attachment experiences 
leads to a developmental line of psychopathology, characterized by a disavowal of 
attachment experiences and capacity to think about them, resulting in a deficit of RF and 
meta-cognitive thinking. The subject has then a predisposition to experience mental states in 
physical and bodily ways, making him or her liable to offend, especially through violent acts. 
The study has major limitations. These include the small sample size, the cross-sectional 
case control design, and the limited assessment of the medically ill control group. This is not 
an epidemiological sample, and generalizations are therefore limited. It would be important to 
explore whether violent offenders who appear less reflective than non-violent offenders were 
also likely to be more dismissing and less preoccupied and angry. However, the sample size 
of violent offenders was far too small to permit a legitimate contrast on the categorical 
variables related to attachment. The study has not explored the predictors of RF, which may 
have generated alternative accounts. The sample was too small and the available measures 
too sparse to put alternative accounts to substantive test. The therapeutic implications of our 
observations at this stage can only be speculative. Even if low RF turns out to be on the 
causal path to violence, this does not necessarily imply that addressing this issue 
therapeutically would lead to a reduction in violent acts. 
The common path to violence is a momentary inhibition of the capacity for mentalization. 
This requires one of three conditions: (1) a particular biology in which intentional states are 
not normally responded to by the individual (“I cannot recognize”); (2) a particular personal 
history in which the person cannot recognize intentional states because his or her intentional 
states were not normally responded to (“I am not recognized”); (3) a particular social 
environment in which the individual feels merged with other subjectivities, and the biological 
need to see self and others as intentional is temporarily removed, as might happen in a large 
group or as part of military training (“I cannot be recognized”). Each mode of violence 
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demands a different degree of inhibition of mentalization, depending on factors such as (1) 
felt anonymity, (2) the physical proximity of the victim, (3) the time it takes to carry out the act, 
and (4) the amount of eye contact that the violent act entails, since it is through the eyes that 
intentional states are normally read (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). 
Modes of violence requiring less inhibition of mentalization are likely to be practised by a 
wider range of people in a wider range of contexts and are therefore more dangerous (thus 
using one’s hands takes longer than using a knife, which involves more proximity than the 
use of a gun, which in turn requires more inhibition of mentalization than the use of a bomb). 
This formulation considers low RF to be a “trait” variable predisposing an individual to the 
complete loss of mentalizing in the context of high levels of arousal. 
There are two groups of individuals for whom this evolutionary design proved ineffective. 
The first group are likely to be there
5
 because of genetic predisposition rather than social 
experience (Moosajee, 2003; Sluyter, Arseneault, Moffit, Veenema, de Boer, & Koolhaas, 
2003). Thus individuals constitutionally poor at recognizing mental states in others through 
facial expressions or vocal tones may not fully acquire mentalization and thus inhibit their 
natural violence (Blair, 2001; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, & Dolan, 
1999). In line with the terrible threat such individuals represent, we dismiss them as 
psychopaths, a term intended to create maximal distance between them and us. 
Individuals in the second group may not acquire the capacity to interpret minds simply 
because they never had the opportunity to learn about mental states in the context of 
appropriate attachment relationships. Alternatively, their attachment experiences may have 
been cruelly or consistently disrupted. For others, the emerging capacity for mentalization has 
been destroyed by an attachment figure, whose thoughts and feelings about the child 
provoked sufficient anxiety for the child to want to avoid thinking about these thoughts and 
feelings. We have claimed along with others that the capacity for mentalization is linked to 
attachment (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002; Meins, Ferryhough, Fradley, & Tuckey, 
2001). We learn about minds, our own and those of others, through experiencing our internal 
states being understood by another mind. At least three types of dysfunctions of attachment 
may lead to violence: (1) attachment experiences may have been consistently disrupted by 
combination of social circumstance and parental failure; (2) attachment problems associated 
with child’s temperament (e.g., fearlessness leading the child not to seek out attachment 
figure, in turn leading to a failure to acquire the capacity robustly to mentalize); (3) later 
attachment trauma when a nascent capacity for mentalization has been destroyed by a 
powerful figure, who created sufficient anxiety about his or her thoughts and feelings towards 
the child for the child to wish to avoid thinking about the subjective experience of others (see 
Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1997; Fonagy, Target, Steele, Steele, Leigh, Levinson, et 
al., 1997). It is important to retain an awareness of the possibility that violence may be rooted 
in the disorganization of the attachment system. A child may manifest an apparent 
callousness that is actually rooted in anxiety about attachment relationships. Perhaps this is 
also part of an evolutionarily adaptive scenario, because a harsh early childhood could signal 
greater future need for interpersonal violence (see Belsky, 1999).  Our findings are consistent 
with psychoanalytic formulations offered by clinicians with forensic interests, for instance 
Meloy and Sohn, who also link violence to the projection of an intolerable aspect of the self, 
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including unbearable affect and its projective identification in the victim, who is attacked to 
destroy this aspect (Meloy, 1992, 2000; Sohn, 1995), and are also consistent with Sohn's 
(1995) clinical description of patients with a history of trauma and loss, who are unable to 
tolerate the experience of depression and humiliation.  In such individuals a further rejection 
may trigger a violent act, because they lack the capacity for symbolization. 
The group whose aggression is high in early childhood, and continues into adolescence 
and early adulthood, we argue are likely to have had attachment experiences that failed to 
establish a sense of the other as a psychological entity. We know from other longitudinal 
work (Rutter, 2000) that environmental influences that divert the child from paths of violence 
and behavioural disturbance often imply the establishment of strong attachment relationships 
with relatively healthy individuals. In such relationships the adolescent can acquire implicit 
knowledge of minds. The provision of psychotherapy for disturbed adolescents and adult 
offenders may assist in this developmental change. To reduce the risk of violence to us, we 
need to ensure that social institutions (families, nurseries, schools, detention centres, prisons, 
and secure hospitals) are designed to enrich representations of mental states in self and 
others. For example, teachers should help the class to reflect on incidents of bullying rather 
than adopt power assertive strategies of exclusion (Twemlow et al., 2001; Twemlow, Fonagy, 
Sacco, Otoole, & Vernberg, 2002).  Prisons that adopt power-assertive strategies as part of a 
social defence system, activating organizational defence mechanisms of splitting and 
projection, too often become a re-enactment of the offenders’ early attachment experiences. 
The splitting and projection of good and bad, of power into the authorities, of helplessness 
into the inmates, idealization of rigid responses and the denigration of thinking promote 
further brutalization, humiliation, and aggression. To reduce the risks of trans-generational 
transmission of this type of psychopathology and the escalation violence, prisons and centres 
for adolescents could be developed along psychotherapeutic lines, incorporating a “culture of 
enquiry” (Main, 1983) to reflect upon the institutional dynamics and individuals’ problems and 
psychotherapy to help individuals develop a capacity to reflect on their own and others’ 
minds. 
 
Table 1. Demographic and Clinical Characteristics of the Samples 
 Prison 
group 
Personality 
disorder controls 
Normal 
controls 
Number of subjects (n) 22 22 22 
Demographic variables    
 Gender (% male) 100% 100% 100% 
 Mean age (s.d.) 28.9 (8.3) 30.3 (5.8) 31.5 (4.9) 
 Mean estimated IQ (s.d.)
6
 110.9 (10.5) 113.4 (8.9) 112.8 (8.4) 
 Social class (% SC IV & V) 95% 70% 75% 
% non-white 13% 13% 13% 
Diagnostic data (% meeting 
DSM criteria) 
   
 Major depression 77% 96% NA 
 Anxiety disorder* 5% 32% NA 
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 Substance abuse 77% 60% NA 
 Eating disorder 0% 9% NA 
 Cluster B, PD 80% 69% NA 
 Other PDs 59% 64% NA 
 Mean No. Axis I diagnoses 
(s.d.) 
3.0 (2.3) 3.1 (1.2) NA 
 Mean No. Axis II diagnoses, 
(s.d.) 
3 (2.3) 2.5 (0.9) NA 
 Mean GAF score (s.d.)** 48.3 (7.3) 32.3 (10.1) NA 
 Mean BDI (s.d.) 22.31 (14.1) 24.1 (10.0) NA 
*significant difference p < 0.05. **significant difference p < 0.011 
 
Table 2. Distribution of AAI Classifications across the Three Groups 
 
 Prison group 
n (%) 
Personality 
disorder controls 
n (%) 
Medical 
controls 
n (%) 
Four-way classification    
Secure 4 (18.2%) 5 (22.7%) 12 (54.5%) 
Preoccupied 3 (13.6%) 11 (50%) 3 (13.6%) 
Dismissing 8 (36.4%) 0  5 (22.7%) 
CC 7 (31.8%) 6 (27.3%) 2 (9.1%) 
Abuse history    
Physical 14 (63.6%) 8 (36.4%) 0 
Sexual 4 (18.2%) 1 (4.5%) 0 
Neither 4 (18.2%) 13 (59.1%) 22 (100%) 
Unresolved with respect 
to loss or trauma  
   
Resolved 14 (63.6%) 9 (40.9%) 22 (100%) 
Unresolved 8 (36.4%) 13 (59%) 0 
Unresolved with respect 
to physical or sexual 
abuse 
   
Resolved 12 (66.7%) 2 (22.2%) NA 
Unresolved 6 (33.3%) 7 (77.8%) NA 
 
 
Table 3. Mean and Standard AAI Scale Scores of Prisoners and PD and Medical Controls 
GROUPS 
 
1. Prison 
group (n 
= 22) 
mean(SD
)  
2. PD 
control (n 
= 22) 
mean(SD
) 
3. 
Medical 
control (n 
= 22) 
mean(SD
) 
ANOVA 
(F) 
 
Bonferroni 
adjustment p 
values for post 
hoc controls 
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     Group 1 
vs. 
Group 3 
Group 1 
vs. 
Group 2 
Experience 
Scale 
      
 Loving 2.66 (0.8) 3.14 (1.8) 4.49 (1.3) 11.14 *** .0001  (NS) 
 Rejection 5.84 (1.6) 5.59 (2.5) 2.48 (1.3) 22.25 *** .0001  (NS) 
 Neglect 6.94 (1.3) 5.61 (2.5) 3.02 (1.3) 26.45 *** .0001  .05  
 Pressure 1.30 (0.6) 2.30 (1.4) 2.29 (0.9) 6.74 ** .007  .007  
 
State of mind 
Scale 
      
 Anger 2.64 (1.6) 4.16 (1.9) 1.79 (1.2) 12.35 *** (NS) .007  
 Idealisation. 4.15 (1.9) 2.66 (1.9) 2.65 (1.0) 5.93 ** .01  .01  
 Derogation 2.13 (1.3) 2.55 (1.5) 1.81 (1.1) 1.70 
(NS) 
(NS) (NS) 
 Passivity 4.02 (2.4) 3.23 (2.0) 2.08 (1.0) 5.77 ** .004  (NS) 
 Coherence 3.16 (1.7) 4.36 (1.8) 4.45 (0.9) 4.91 ** .02 .03 
 Fear of loss 1.59 (1.0) 1.32 (0.6) 0.86 (0.2) 5.92 * .004  (NS) 
 Recall 4.19 (2.5) 3.77 (1.7) 2.82 (1.4) 2.81 
(NS) 
.07  (NS) 
       
Reflective 
function 
2.11 (1.4) 3.77 (1.9) 5.00 (1.7) 16.17*** .0001 .0005 
* p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001 
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